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§ Abstract 
 
In the natural resource literature, conventional wisdom holds that weak property rights will cause a 
resource to be over-exploited. This is because weak property rights are typically perceived as a problem 
of input exclusion. In this paper, we first present evidence to the effect that weak property rights often 
take the form of contestable outputs – or output theft – and that this has an impact on resource use. We 
then propose a theoretical model of natural resource use under generally weak property rights – or weak 
state presence – when resource users face the dual problem of input exclusion and output appropriation. 
We show that introducing the possibility that outputs can be contested acts as an output tax, with the 
added twist that resource users effectively determine the level of the tax. This tax has a depressive effect 
on input use. As a result, whether the resource is under- or over-exploited in equilibrium will depend on 
the relative severity of output appropriation and input exclusion problems when property rights are 
generally weak. 
 
Key words: Natural Resources, Property Rights, Trespass, Theft, Over-Exploitation, Under-
Exploitation. 
 






Dans la littérature sur les ressources naturelles, on associe généralement une déficience dans les droits 
de propriété avec une sur-exploitation de la ressource. Ceci s'explique par le fait que la déficience est 
surtout perçue comme une exclusion incomplète des utilisateurs de la ressource. Dans ce travail, nous 
présentons plusieurs cas où le problème de propriété porte tout autant sur l'appropriation des biens 
produits par les utilisateurs, ou le vol. Un modèle théorique est proposé dans lequel il est démontré que 
ce problème mène plutôt à une sous-utilisation de la ressource. Ainsi, dans les régions où les droits de 
propriété sont mal protégés de manière générale, souvent dû à un état faible, on doit s'attendre à ce que 
les deux types de problèmes coexistent. Il sera dès lors nécessaire de comparer la sévérité des deux 
déficiences de protection afin de déterminer si la ressource sera sur- ou sous-exploitée à l'équilibre. 
 
Mots clés: Ressources naturelles, Droits de propriété, empiètement, vol, sur-exploitation, 
sous-exploitation 
 
Classification JEL: K11, K42, Q2, N50, O13. 1
1 Introduction
In the natural resource economics literature, weak property rights are typi-
cally presented as the fundamental cause of resource overexploitation. The
basic argument can be traced back to the pioneering work of Gordon (1954),
who explained that in the absence of ownership rights to a ﬁshery, all ﬁshers
enjoy a free access and this yields an equilibrium with excessive input use
and low rents. This standard story has led many to equate weak property
rights with resource overexploitation.
Now as Gaudet, Moreaux and Salant (2002) justly point out, the con-
vention in natural resource models has been to “assume that everything ex-
tracted under the rule of capture is marketed immediately”, as Gordon (1954)
did. Implicit with this assumption is the fact that there are no property right
issues regarding the extracted resource, that is, output appropriation is not
being contested. This assumption is not innocuous. To illustrate, take two
gold prospectors on a creek, John and Peter. Under the rule of capture, on
one hand, the gold lying at the bottom of the creek belongs to no-one, but
the gold nugget that is found belongs to its founder. John and Peter are
therefore racing to ﬁnd gold in the creek. Under immediate marketing, on
the other hand, John - and everyone else standing between the creek and the
market, for that matter - does not dispute the fact that the gold scooped up
by Peter belongs to Peter. Now if property rights are weak because of a weak
state presence, it is reasonable to assume that property rights may be gener-
ally weak, not just in terms of exclusive access to a resource. Consequently,
bringing gold to the market may not be so straightforward.
More generally, in the “Gordon setting”, a situation of weak property
rights over unextracted resources co-exists with the presence of strong prop-
erty rights over extracted resources. This may have been a fair representation
of the problems facing cod ﬁshers in Newfoundland in the 1950s. In many
other contexts of resource use, however, this co-existence of weak and strong
property rights does not depict reality well, especially under a weak state
presence. Resource users are often faced with a dual enforcement problem:
not only is access to the resource imperfectly controlled, but some of the
output produced may also be appropriated, or stolen, by others. In the light
of this dual enforcement problem, the purpose of this paper is to analyse the
consequent decisions of natural resource users.
We begin by presenting evidence of dual enforcement problems taken
from existing case studies. This evidence is used to set-up a simple two-2
dimensional analytical framework helpful in comparing the cases in terms of
the relative importance of each enforcement problem. A theoretical model
is then proposed which accounts for the strategic behavior of three types of
agents: a resource manager as a leading resource user and output appro-
priator; trespassers as illegitimate or fringe resource users; and thieves as
illegitimate output appropriators.
We show that in the presence of generally weak property rights, theoret-
ical predictions regarding resource use can be drastically diﬀerent from the
tragedy of the commons story. Indeed, the presence of output theft causes
the resource to be under-exploited. This is because output appropriation by
others acts as a tax on output, with the added twist that the tax level is
endogenously determined by resource users. As a result, when enforcement
is partial for both input exclusion and output appropriation, whether the
resource ends up being under- or over-exploited will depend on the relative
severity of each enforcement problems. For the particular case of a free-access
resource, the presence of theft actually induces resource conservation. The
ﬂip side is that the introduction of stricter property enforcement measures
against theft that neglect the problem of free access to inputs may cause the
resource to be overused and even lead to its depletion. Comparative static
experiments are performed by varying the degree of property rights enforce-
ment over both input access and output appropriation which are used to
provide insight into various case studies.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, existing case studies are
ﬁrst exposed as supporting evidence for the presence of a dual enforcement
problem. Other cases are also presented where it is argued that one or the
other enforcement problem may prevail at varying degrees. To ﬁx ideas, a
ﬁrst theoretical model is proposed in section 3 in which only the problem
of output appropriation is present. This is followed by a full model of dual
enforcement in section 4. A characterization of possible equilibrium types is
performed in section 5, which is then used in section 6 to provide new insight
into each case discussed in section 2. Section 7 concludes with a discussion
of possible avenues of research.
2 Evidence of dual enforcement problems
In the classical story of the tragedy of the commons, no user has the right
or the ability to exclude others from exploiting a resource. And yet, it is as-
sumed that users have perfectly and costlessly enforced rights over the goods3
being produced with the resource. In this section, we present evidence to
the eﬀect that both types of property enforcement problems often prevail
simultaneously. This will set the stage for the development of a theoretical
model in the following section and show that this has important implications
for our understanding of natural resource use.
In general, property rights must not only be deﬁned and measurable,
but enforced as well. In some settings, enforcement is however notoriously
diﬃcult to achieve. A good example of such a situation is the 1848 California
Gold Rush. Prospectors discovered gold shortly before the territory was
ceded to the United States and well before any eﬀective legal system could
be put in place. The latter didn’t matter, in any case, as most soldiers sent
into the area quickly deserted the army to search for gold. The area was
literally without any enforceable laws. Umbeck’s (1981) excellent study of
this period documents the rise of property rights through private contracts
and threats of violence.
The natural resource being exploited during the Gold Rush must be seen
as a large track of territory over which various gold deposits were (suspected
to be) present but their precise locations were unknown. The exploitation
of this natural resource therefore required exploration eﬀorts as inputs. Now
in the absence of any enforcement of exclusion from the territory, the re-
source was subject to an open access regime of exploitation. In the Gordon
(1954) spirit, the consequence was (probably) an excessive use of inputs, or
exploration eﬀorts; thus the Rush labeling.
It is revealing that Umbeck’s study focused exclusively on the eﬀorts ex-
pended to deﬁne and defend mineral rights. Although he does not present it
in those terms, one must conceptualize this as a problem of exclusion over
the output from a resource. Indeed, exploration eﬀorts produce identiﬁcation
of gold deposits as outputs. Umbeck thus reports on how diﬃcult it was for
an explorer to appropriate the fruits of his eﬀorts. Here, a miner faced the
dual problems of ﬁrst ﬁnding a gold deposit before others did and second
eﬀectively stake and defend a mining claim.
An analogous situation evolved a few decades later on the US western
plains with the rise of the range cattle industry. This era began around 1880
and lasted until the mid to late 1890s. The distinguishing characteristic
of this industry was the use of public domain land for cattle grazing. Huge
cattle ranches actually owned very little land; they would simply release their4
cattle onto the public domain for grazing and then round up the cattle twice
a year for branding and shipping.
Ranchers faced the same set of dual problems as the California miners.
Here, grazing land is the natural resource, number of calves to raise is the
input, and number of grown cattle is the output. First, given that the graz-
ing lands were in the public domain, they could not legally exclude others’
input use. Thus, there were competitors for the land - other cattle ranchers,
sheep farmers, and homesteaders. As such, they had to expend resources,
in both legal and extra-legal activities, to exclude others from using the
ranges. In contrast with the miners’ situation, the resource was thus subject
to some enforcement of exclusion over input use, though costly and incom-
plete. Second, while ranchers legally owned their cattle, there were little
eﬀective government forces to help protect cattle from theft on the ranges.
Therefore, ranchers had to also expend resources to prevent cattle rustling,
that is, excluding others from appropriating the output.
Just as with the California miners, ranchers developed institutions to
deal with the lack of eﬀective property rights. Economic historians, such as
Anderson and Hill (1975), document the rise of these institutions to control
resource use under imperfect exclusion rights. A system of informal con-
straints, known collectively as codes of the west, and range rights, based upon
the doctrine of prior appropriation, evolved to address negative externalities
associated with open range ranching. Additionally, western cattlemen cre-
ated institutions such as cattlemen’s associations to enforce the code, protect
established range rights, and detect stock theft. Fundamentally, stock associ-
ations functioned equivalently to a police force in the face of weak protection
from the state.
Academic research on the range cattle industry has focused, almost exclu-
sively, on the role of the public domain and the incentives created for ranchers
to over-exploit the grasslands. The impact of cattle rustling on resource use
has received little attention. Yet, it is widely recognized that rustling was
an important problem (McFerrin and Wills 2007). In fact, one historian,
Weaver (2003), argues that the main purpose of cattlemen’s associations was
to combat rustling.
It may be argued that one notable diﬀerence between the Gold Rush and
cattle industry examples resides in the fact that in the latter, one notes the
presence of a partial enforcement in both dimensions while in the former, ex-
clusion over input access was practically nonexistent. Conceptually, one can5
imagine any combination of enforcement levels in both dimensions ranging
from nonexistent to partial or complete. Suppose then that exclusion enforce-
ment levels over input access and output appropriation can be represented
by parameters λ and θ respectively, both taking on real values between 0
and 1. A value of 0 corresponds to the absence of exclusion while a value of
1 denotes perfect exclusion. In-between, enforcement of exclusion is partial
and increasing in the respective parameter value. Under this framework, the
enforcement levels corresponding to the Gold Rush and the open range in
the American West can be approximately represented as in ﬁgure 1 by the
















Figure 1: Dual property enforcement levels
The standard economics textbook case of production and trade in the
absence of property enforcement issues is represented by λ = θ = 1 in ﬁgure
1 and is labeled Cl for Classical. Gordon’s (1954) story, on the other hand,
was meant to illustrate the problem of cod ﬁshing in the North Atlantic. In
that setting, it is assumed that a large number of ﬁshers can freely access
the open sea ﬁshery, thus corresponding to an absence of input exclusion
enforcement, or λ = 0. On the other hand, output theft is not an issue.
Once a ﬁsher’s catch is brought to shore, it is immediately sold to market
in its entirety, thus corresponding to perfect enforcement against theft, or
θ = 1. This situation corresponds to the point labeled G in ﬁgure 1. The
other points appearing in ﬁgure 1 are explained by the following additional6
cases.
Cases of dual exclusion problems can also be found in developing countries
today where resource users operate under a weak state presence. Mbogo
(2009) documents the case of common pasture farmers in semi-arid regions
of Africa, who face situations akin to those of open range cattlemen in the
American West reported above. They formed cooperative agreements for
the management of common pasturage, but the threat of violent cattle theft
increased to a level where they now avoid these grazing districts altogether.
This case would arguably correspond to the point labeled CPA in ﬁgure 1.
One notes that in this case, the presence of theft is reported to result in a
complete failure to exploit the resource.
In other settings, access to the resource is not subject to contestation
but output theft is still a major problem, that is, λ is close to 1 but θ is
clearly below 1. The use of undeveloped land for urban farming provides
a good case in point. According to some accounts, crop theft acts as a
major impediment to the development of urban agriculture, even though it
can help feed the urban poor. Studies like those of Mboganie-Mwangi and
Foeken (1996), Ellis and Sumberg (1998) or Bryld (2003) invariably report
that this is the case for plots of land located far away from the homes. We
therefore illustrate the case of urban land farming by the point labeled ULF
in ﬁgure 1. On the other hand, land adjacent to the home is still sometimes
farmed, despite imperfect enforcement against theft. The case of urban home
farming is thus illustrated by the point labeled UHF in ﬁgure 1. Similarly,
agricultural theft in rural areas is a signiﬁcant problem today in many parts
of the world. According to a recent publication by the Technical Centre for
Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA), “Agricultural theft is a serious
problem for many ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Paciﬁc group) producers,
causing massive losses and prompting some farmers to give up altogether.
[...] A Trinidadian farmer with a herd of 120 cows invested in a milking
parlour and a dairy processing plant. Within 2 years every animal had been
stolen. Today, the farm has been cut up into building lots.” (Spore 2009)
The article reports that theft aﬀects all types of agricultural productions,
from coﬀee cherries to vanilla beans and livestocks. Fafchamps and Minten
(2006) relatedly provides evidence that crop theft increases with transitory
poverty. Similarly, a Zimbabwean newspaper article attributes the large drop
in cattle farming in the past ten years to rampant rustling. (Sakala 2011)
One may therefore think of rural theft problems as falling anywhere between7
the Urban Home Farming and the Urban Land Farming cases, as illustrated
by the point labeled RT in ﬁgure 1.
Inshore ﬁsheries are also often fraught with problems of imperfect en-
forcement. Wennersten (2007), for example, recounts the history of policing
problems and illegal oyster ﬁshing that dragged on for over two centuries on
the Chesapeake Bay. According to Wennersten’s accounts, the problem was
in large part due to insuﬃcient policing resources, a form of state weakness
with λ much below 1. The history of lobster harvesting in Maine as reported
in Acheson (1988) similarly describes a situation of partial exclusion enforce-
ment issues. Output theft, however, did not seem to be a serious problem for
inshore ﬁshers, an indicator of state strength with theta close to 1. In any
case, an inshore ﬁshery would correspond to the point labeled IF in ﬁgure 1.
A ﬁnal case of interest in that of the whaling industry of the 18th and
19th century as recounted by Ellickson (1991). Contrary to inshore ﬁshers
but similarly to cod ﬁshers, whalers operated in the open seas and thus could
hardly count on any state presence. For technological reasons and contrary
to cod ﬁshers, whalers did however face a problem of output appropriation.
Indeed, it was not uncommon that a whale would slip away from the ﬁrst
ship that spotted and hunted it, only to be easily picked up, once weakened
or dead, by another whaler. Now given that the bulk of the cost of input
eﬀorts in whale ﬁshing is the time spent locating a whale, much more than
the actual hunting phase – a whaling voyage could last up to four years – it is
not surprising that this often led to serious ownership contestations over dead
whales. Ellickson argues that the international whaling community was a sur-
prisingly close-knit community and that they therefore managed to develop
ownership norms for previously hunted loose whales which where reasonably
successful in rewarding the eﬀort of its initial founder. They were, however,
never successful at solving the problem of free access to whaling eﬀorts. This
situation is actually quite similar to that of the Gold Rush described above.
In ﬁgure 1, points WI1 and WI2 represent the whaling industry respectively
before and after the adoption of norms regarding whale capture. Given that
input eﬀort exclusion remained unenforced, i.e. λ = 0, our model will pre-
dict that the adoption of the norm may have contributed to the depletion of
whale stocks.
With the above cases in mind, we shall propose a model of resource use
when enforcement against both input exclusion and output appropriation
can both vary as per ﬁgure 1.8
3 A model of theft and natural resource use
Let y denote the output produced from a (natural) resource. Typically,
output quantities depend on the size of the resource stock and various input
quantities such as labor and physical capital. But in order to simplify the
analysis, we assume the size of the resource stock to be ﬁxed throughout and
that output depends on a single measure of total input eﬀort denoted X. We
thus have y = f(X), where function f is increasing and concave.
It is assumed that inputs X have constant unit costs c and output y
fetches a constant unit price p. Net proﬁts from the resource are thus given
by π = pf(X)−cX and the (ﬁrst-best) eﬃcient input quantity X∗ is deﬁned
by the condition that equates marginal revenues and costs; that is,
pf
0(X
∗) = c. (1)
The eﬃcient input quantity will be chosen by the resource manager, pro-
vided that property rights can be perfectly and costlessly deﬁned and en-
forced. But such ideal conditions are rarely met in practice, as outlined in
section 2. We will therefore consider two major types of property enforcement
problems that resource managers were reported to face: One is the exclusion
of unauthorized, or unwanted, exploiters of the resource. The other relates
to the ﬁnal appropriation of outputs by non-exploiters. For convenience, we
shall refer to the ﬁrst problem as trespass and the second as theft.
It should be noted that for our purpose, it is inconsequential whether
the resource manager is a farmer, a state bureaucrat, the agent of a local
collective or ﬁrm, or even a locally powerful thug. In the case of a common
property resource, for instance, trespassers and thieves may be members of
the collectives themselves who break its own rules.1 In any case, the resource
manager is deﬁned as the person with de facto property rights in the sense
that trespassers and thieves will be punished if caught.
For clarity of exposition and since most readers tend to be familiar with
the problem of input exclusion, we begin with the case of output appropri-
ation problems only in this section.2 The full dual problem will then be
formally introduced in section 4.
1On enforcement issues with common property resources see, for instance, Ostrom
(1990) and Stevenson (1991).
2See Hotte (2005) for a model of resource use with imperfect input exclusion only.9
3.1 The players and their actions
There are m + 1 individuals: one resource manager and m thieves. The
manager chooses an input level X ≥ 0. Thief k chooses theft eﬀort zk ≥ 0,




The thieves Let s denote the total share of output appropriated by all
thieves combined. The total theft eﬀort being equal to Z, this share depends
positively on total theft eﬀort according to the following theft function:
s = s(Z), s ∈ [0,1], sZ > 0, sZZ < 0,s(0) = 0, lim
Z→∞
s(Z) = 1. (2)
Decreasing returns to theft may be justiﬁed by the fact that some outputs are
easier to steal than others. In the case of grazing land for instance, thieves
may easily steal ﬁrst the stray cattle far away from the rancher’s home, and
then need more time to get to the other cattle. Figuratively speaking, thieves
will pick the low-lying fruits ﬁrst.
Given X, the thieves’ total booty is thus s(Z)pf(X). Under the assump-
tion that thieves are identical in terms of the productivity of their eﬀorts,
we posit that a thief collects a share of the total booty which corresponds to
the proportion of his eﬀort with respect to the total eﬀort; that is, the booty
for thief k is given by ys
k = (zk/Z)s(Z)pf(X). (Superscript s refers to the
activity of stealing.) For further analysis, it will be convenient to introduce
function ¯ s(Z) as the share stolen per unit theft eﬀort; that is, ¯ s(Z) ≡ s(Z)/Z,
where ¯ s0(Z) < 0 due to decreasing returns.
Each thief is assumed to have a constant unit opportunity cost of theft
eﬀort equal to w. Moreover, the presence of a local justice system, norms,
or retaliation possibilities, is such that each thief expects to be caught with
exogenous probability θ ∈ [0,1]. If thief k is caught, his booty is simply
conﬁscated and returned to the community as a whole. No other penalty is
exacted. We therefore have that for given input level X and eﬀort levels of




zj, the expected payoﬀ for thief
k is given by
π
s
k = zk¯ s(zk + Z−k)(1 − θ)pf(X) − wzk.10
The manager The manager’s unit input cost is assumed constant and
equal to c. For a given total theft eﬀort level Z, he loses a share s(Z) of his
output, so that his gain is given by
π
m = (1 − s(Z))pf(X) − cX.
3.3 The sequence of decisions
We assume that the manager acts as a leader by ﬁrst choosing input quantity
X. Thieves then choose their theft eﬀorts after having observed output level
y. Those theft eﬀorts are however chosen simultaneously between thieves
and non-cooperatively in Nash fashion. This means that each thief must
choose his eﬀort level before knowing what other thieves’ decisions are. Those
decisions may however be correctly anticipated as each is perfectly informed
about the presence of the other thieves and their problem set.
3.4 The theft equilibrium
We now derive the equilibrium choices for each individual. We begin with
the theft equilibrium since it is the last stage. We subsequently move up to
the choice of the manager who may anticipate the thieves’ reactions.
3.4.1 The theft stage
The individual reaction functions are obtained by solving for the following





k = zk¯ s(zk + Z−k)(1 − θ)pf(X) − wzk. (3)




= [¯ s(Z) + zk¯ s
0(Z)](1 − θ)pf(X) − w = 0, ∀k ∈ {1,...,m}. (4)
The ﬁrst term between square brackets represents the (marginal) beneﬁt from
a unit increase in theft eﬀort. This is equal to the share of stolen output per
unit theft eﬀort multiplied by the total output value and adjusted for the
probability of being caught. The second term between square brackets is
negative and accounts for the diminishing returns from theft eﬀorts.11
Given that thieves are all identical, we characterize the symmetrical Nash
equilibrium in which ze
1 = ze
2 = ... = ze
m ≡ ze. The total equilibrium theft
eﬀort is thus Ze = mze and is given by the following condition, which insures






0(Z)](1 − θ)pf(X) = w. (5)
Through implicit diﬀerentiation of (5), one obtains that Ze is increasing in
X, which leads us to assert the following:
Proposition 1 Output theft can be reduced through a reduction in the input
level.
For analytical convenience, we shall approximate a situation with a large
number of thieves by considering the case where m → ∞, in which case
equilibrium (5) becomes3
¯ s(Z
e)(1 − θ)pf(X) = w. (6)
Proof: Through implicit diﬀerentiation, (5) gives ∂Ze/∂m > 0. Since
limZ→∞ s(Z) = 1, we have limZ→∞ ¯ s(Z) = 0. This implies that limm→∞ Ze <
∞, lest condition (5) be violated. Consequently limm→∞ Ze/m = 0 and we
obtain (6). ￿










It can similarly be veriﬁed that the supply of theft eﬀort decreases with
its opportunity cost w and the enforcement level θ, and increases with the
resource price p. Assuming further that limZ→0 ¯ s(Z) < ∞, we have that with
suﬃciently large w or θ, or with low enough output X, theft activities can





3For additional insight, it may be interesting to consider the case of a ﬁnite number
of thieves. There is no reason to believe, however, that this would alter the fundamental
qualitative results of this paper. Since this would signiﬁcantly increase the complexity of
the analysis, we leave this for future work.12
In the ensuing analysis, it will be convenient to refer to term ¯ s(X)pf(X)
as the ex-enforcement return to theft and the right-hand side term as the
enforcement-adjusted opportunity cost of theft eﬀorts. According to (6),
θ > 0 implies that the unit return to theft incorporates a risk premium. Let
us now turn to the decision of the resource manager.
3.4.2 The input decision stage
The manager’s problem is to choose the input level X while anticipating its
eﬀect on the total theft eﬀort Ze implicitly determined by equality (6). This
problem can be expressed as follows:
max
X,Ze π
m = (1 − s(Ze))pf(X) − cX, (9)
s.t. ¯ s(Ze)(1 − θ)pf(X) ≤ w, (10)
Ze ≥ 0, (11)
along with the complementary slackness condition. The ﬁrst-order condition
for an interior solution is
∂πm
∂X









s) − c = 0, (12)
where ∂Ze/∂X is given by (7) and Xs denotes the proﬁt maximizing choice
of the manager. The ﬁrst term in the derivative denotes the beneﬁt from
a marginal increase in X, which is equal to the additional output produced
adjusted for the fact that only share 1 − s(Ze) will accrue to the manager.
The middle term is a cost which accounts for the fact that an input increase
tends to attract more theft eﬀort and thus increases the stolen share by
amount s0(Ze)(∂Ze/∂X). The third term is just the direct marginal input
cost.
First-order condition (12) indicates that in an interior solution, theft acts
as an ad-valorem tax on output. Interestingly, however, the magnitude of
the tax is endogenous as it is set by the manager himself when he takes into
account the eﬀect of X on Ze. Hence the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The presence of output theft acts as an ad-valorem output
tax imposed on the resource manager, the magnitude of which is endogenously
set by the resource manager herself.13
In the case of a corner solution, the following conditions hold at Ze = 0











s) − c ≤ 0, (13)
¯ s(0)(1 − θ)pf(X
s) = w. (14)
This condition corresponds to a situation where the resource manager pro-
duces at the maximum level before which thieves become interested in steal-
ing the output. Though there is no theft in this equilibrium, the theft problem
is still present given that it aﬀects the choice of X.
Finally, one may also envisage the possibility that the following inequality
holds:
¯ s(0)(1 − θ)pf(X
∗) ≤ w. (15)
In this case, the manager can produce at the rent maximizing level without
worrying about theft at all. This may be made possible by a high enforcement
level θ and would correspond to the implicit assumption of immediate output
marketing.
Note ﬁnally that through rearrangement of interior condition (12), we









Since f00 < 0, this implies that the resource manager chooses an input quan-
tity that is lower than the eﬃcient one as deﬁned by (1); that is, Xs < X∗.
Inequality (16) makes clear that this under-use result is brought about by
two eﬀects: One is the tax eﬀect due to term (1−s(Ze)). The other is due to
term s0(Ze)(∂Ze/∂X) which may be termed a deterrence eﬀect since it aims
to lower s(Z) through an input reduction. In the case of corner solution (13),
only the deterrence eﬀect is present. The above results are summarized by
the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The possibility of output theft causes the resource to be un-
derused. In an interior solution, underuse is due to a combination of both a
tax and a deterrence eﬀect. In a corner solution, underuse results from just
a deterrence eﬀect.14
The interior solution case is represented by point B in ﬁgure 2, where
∆(Z) denotes the theft eﬀort increase eﬀect in expression (12); that is,
∆(Z) ≡ s0(Ze)(∂Ze/∂X)pf(Xs). The (classical) eﬃcient use level in the











Figure 2: Resource underuse under contestable outputs
4 The dual problem of exclusion
In this section, we consider a setting with a generally weak state presence in
the sense that the resource manager must face a dual problem of exclusion,
that is, over both inputs and outputs.
4.1 The agents and their actions
Recall that in the introduction to section 3, we referred to unauthorized use
of the resource as trespass. So in addition to a resource manager and m
thieves, we now have n trespassers.4 There are thus m + n + 1 players. The
manager and trespasser i each choose their input quantities to exploit the
4The trespass part of the model is based on Hotte (2005).15
resource, denoted xm and xt
i respectively, i ∈ {1,2,...,n}. The total input








As before, thief k chooses theft eﬀort zk ≥ 0, k ∈ {1,2,...,m}, for a total




The thieves The thieves’ payoﬀs are identical to those of section 3.2. Note
that thieves do not diﬀerentiate between the outputs of the manager and
those of the various trespassers.
The trespassers Trespassers are all identically productive in terms of their
input eﬀorts. This productivity is also assumed identical to that of the
resource manager. The average product of each input is thus the same for
all and is represented by the following function for analytical convenience:
¯ f(X) ≡ f(X)/X, where ¯ f0(X) < 0 due to decreasing returns. The output
harvested by trespasser i’s input is thus given by xt
i ¯ f(X).
Given thieves’ total eﬀort Z, each trespasser expects to lose a share s(Z)
from his own output. Moreover, each trespasser expects to be caught with
probability λ ∈ [0,1], in which case his or her output is simply conﬁscated
and returned to the community as a whole. No other penalty is exacted.






j(1 − λ)(1 − s(Z))p ¯ f(X) − cx
t







The resource manager The manager chooses input quantity xm at con-
stant unit cost c and average product ¯ f(X). This yields the following gain:
π
m = (1 − s(Z))p ¯ f(X)x
m − cx







4.3 The sequence of decisions
The sequence of decisions follows three stages:
1. The manager chooses xm ﬁrst.
2. Each trespasser i then chooses his or her input level xt
i, i ∈ {1,2,...,n},
after having observed the manager’s input choice xm. The trespassers’
decisions are however taken simultaneously and non-cooperatively, in
Nash fashion.
3. As in section 3, each thief k observes the total output level y = f(X)
and decides on a level of theft eﬀort zk, k ∈ {1,2,...,m}. Thieves’ deci-
sions are taken simultaneously and non-cooperatively, in Nash fashion.
4.4 The dual equilibrium
We now derive the equilibrium choices of each agent. We begin with the theft
equilibrium since it is the last stage. We then move up to the trespass equi-
librium, in which trespassers can anticipate the thieves’ reactions. The choice
of the manager is considered last, as she can anticipate both the trespassers’
and the thieves’ reactions. Throughout the analysis, all agents take as given
the probabilities of catching either a thief or a trespasser, denoted θ and λ
respectively, which act as proxies for the weakness of property rights over
output appropriation and input uses respectively, or the state’s presence.
4.4.1 The third stage: Theft
The thieves’ equilibrium is identical to that of section 3.4.1, the sole diﬀerence
being that the total input X is now given by expression (17). For simplicity,
we still assume that the number of thieves is large enough that the theft
equilibrium can be approximated by equilibrium condition (6).
4.4.2 The second stage: Trespass
We now turn to the second stage, in which n trespassers simultaneously
choose their input quantities after having observed xm and while anticipating









j(1 − s(Z))(1 − λ)p ¯ f(X) − cx
t
j, (20)
s.t. ¯ s(Z)(1 − θ)pf(X) = w, (21)







Assuming an interior solution, trespasser j’s reaction function is charac-


















This condition states that when adding a (marginal) unit input to the re-
source, a trespasser has to weigh the beneﬁt that the average product confers
to additional revenues, against its costs, composed of the induced drop in av-
erage productivity, the induced increase in theft eﬀorts, and the direct cost of
an input. In this calculation, only the direct cost is known with certainty; the
other costs and beneﬁts are weighed by the probability of not being caught.
Moreover, the added revenue and negative productivity eﬀects only matter
for the share that is not lost to theft. And ﬁnally, since trespasser j is only
concerned about how the negative productivity and increased theft eﬀects
aﬀects his own proﬁt, the term between square brackets is weighed by xt
j.
One notes that in the presence of theft, the fact that trespassers act as
non-cooperative users generates two types of negative externalities. Indeed, if
all n+1 resource users were to behave cooperatively and maximize total rents
while dealing with the problem of theft, the term between square brackets
would be multiplied by X instead of xt
j only. One externality is due to the
well-known negative product eﬀect ¯ f0(X). But we now have the additional
increased theft eﬀect s0(Z)∂Z/∂X. This is due to the fact that an increase in
resource output causes an increase in the theft payoﬀ which results in more
theft losses for all users. Hence the following proposition:
Proposition 4 In the presence of theft, imperfect exclusion over input use
leads to two types of negative externalities between users: A negative product
eﬀect and an increased theft eﬀect.18




n ≡ xte. The total trespassing eﬀort is thus = nxte. Inserting this into
reaction function (23), the Nash equilibrium total trespass eﬀort for given
xm is characterized by the following:
(1−λ)p
￿












where X = xm + nxte. Approximating a sitation with a large number of
trespassers with the limiting case where n → ∞, condition (24) becomes5
(1 − λ)(1 − s(Z))p ¯ f(x
m + nx
te) = c. (25)
Not surprisingly, trespassers’ expected rents are exhausted when there is
an arbitrarily large number of them. This outcome is analogous to that of
an open access regime, with the diﬀerence that the average gain must be
adjusted for the probability of being caught and punished, as well as the
share lost to theft. This diﬀerence is not innocuous since with λ > 0, the
average product exceeds the true average cost c in this equilibrium and thus
the resource may still generate net positive rents to the manager, as will be
discussed in detail below.6
Equalities (6) and (25) together form a system which determines both
the (interior) theft and trespass levels for a given input choice xm. Through
implicit diﬀerentiation, we obtain the following eﬀect of an increase in the
manager’s input level:
∂(nxte)
∂xm = −1 < 0 and
∂(Ze)
∂xm = 0. (26)
Hence the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Provided that Ze > 0 and nxte > 0, trespassing can be de-
terred through an increase in the exploitation level, while the theft eﬀort level
remains unaﬀected.
This proposition calls for a few remarks. Firstly, according to (26), not only
does an increase in the manager’s input level deter trespass, but it does so
5The proof is similar to that of expression (6) and is omitted. See also Hotte (2005).
6Put diﬀerently, λ > 0 implies an equilibrium with a risk a premium for trespassers.19
at a one-to-one ratio, thus leaving the output unchanged. This explains why
the theft eﬀort remains unaﬀected. Given that the manager can anticipate
those reactions, it will impact her exploitation decisions. Secondly, it should
be noted that those results are obtained under the approximations of large
numbers of both thieves and trespassers. As will become clear below, those
assumptions have the advantage of greatly simplifying the analysis while
preserving the qualitative nature of the dual exclusion problem facing the
resource manager.
4.4.3 The ﬁrst stage: The manager
For simplicity, we consider interior theft cases only. In the case of an interior
solution for trespass also, the manager’s problem is expressed as follows:
max
xm,xte,Zeπ
m = (1 − s(Z))p ¯ f(X)xm − cxm, (27)
s.t. (1 − s(Z))p ¯ f(X) =
c
1−λ, for nx
te > 0, (28)
¯ s(Z)(1 − θ)pf(X) = w, (29)
X = xm + nxte. (30)
According to constraint (28), a positive trespass level nxte > 0 implies
that (1 − s(Z))p ¯ f(X) is constant in xm and larger than c. The marginal
return to xm is therefore larger than its marginal cost. As a result, the
manager will choose to increase xm up until nxte becomes zero; that is, up
until trespassing is completely deterred, at which point equality (28) can be
expressed as (1 − s(Z))p ¯ f(xm) = c/(1 − λ) and the manager’s problem can
be restated as follows:
max
xm,Zeπ
m = (1 − s(Z))pf(xm) − cxm, (31)
s.t. (1 − s(Z))p ¯ f(xm) ≤ c
1−λ [trespass constraint] (32)
¯ s(Z)(1 − θ)pf(xm) = w [theft constraint] (33)
The inequality in the trespass constraint accounts for the possibility that
for some given xm, trespassers may receive a strictly negative return from
any amount of their eﬀort, however small.
The manager’s optimal choice must respect the following inequality:
∂πm






m) − c ≤ 0. (34)20
The inequality in (34) accounts for the fact that xm may be determined by
the trespass constraint (32) as a strict equality. If (34) is respected with strict
equality, then trespass is not aﬀecting equilibrium decisions. This could be
because exclusion enforcement against trespassers is high enough (λ is high)
or because theft is so important that trespassers are completely deterred,
or a combination of both. Conversely, if the trespass constraint binds in
equilibrium while (34) is respected with strict inequality, then trespass does
aﬀect input decisions.
Note that the problem contains two endogenous variables, xm and Z, and
is thus fully determined by two equalities: (33) and either of (34) or (32).
Consequently, two types of equilibria emerge which depend on whether the
trespass constraint is binding or not. They are characterized by the following
conditions:
Non-binding trespass If constraint (32) is not binding, the equilibrium is
fully described by (34) being respected with equality and (33).
Binding trespass If constraint (32) is binding, the equilibrium is fully de-
scribed by (32) being respected with equality and (33).
As will be seen in the next section, which of the two equilibrium type
holds in practice leads to diﬀerent predictions regarding resource use.
5 Characterization of the equilibrium types
An equilibrium with a non-binding trespass constraint is referred to as a theft
equilibrium while one with a binding trespass constraint is called trespass-
theft equilibrium. In the proposed partial equilibrium setting, which of the
two equilibria holds will depend on the given prices w, c and p, as well as by
the given enforcement levels θ and λ. For simplicity, it will be convenient to
compare equilibria by assuming exogenous changes in the trespass enforce-
ment level λ only. We begin by assuming that a theft equilibrium is obtained
at a “high” value λ0.
5.1 The theft equilibrium
In the theft equilibrium, λ0 is such that equation (34) is respected with
equality and the equilibrium is the same as that of equation (16) in section
3.4 and illustrated in ﬁgure 2. This result is represented again in ﬁgure 321
where trespass payoﬀ curve (1 − s(Z))p ¯ f(X) has been added. The ﬁgure
underscores the fact that even though the trespass payoﬀ increases as input
use is made smaller than X∗, the theft equilibrium point B yields a trespass
payoﬀ which is still smaller than its detection adjusted opportunity cost
c/(1 − λ0) (see point C). It is interesting to note that if, for some reason,
trespassers were not subject to theft as the manager is, then the trespass
constraint would become binding as the trespass payoﬀ without theft at xm
0
exceeds c/(1 − λ0) (see point D0). One may therefore conclude that the




















Figure 3: Resource underuse with theft and non-binding trespass
In summary, the conclusions of proposition 3 still hold when the trespass
constraint is not binding. We now consider the case of a lower trespass
enforcement level λ1 < λ0.
5.2 The trespass-theft equilibrium
Suppose that the trespass enforcement level λ1 is such that at xm
0 , the en-
forcement adjusted opportunity cost of trespass c/(1−λ1) is now lower than
the trespass payoﬀ (1−s(Z(xm
0 )))p ¯ f(xm
0 ), as illustrated by point C in ﬁgure22
4. The trespass constraint is now binding. Consequently, in order to deter
trespassers, the manager opts to raise input quantities to level xm
1 , where

























Figure 4: Resource under- and over-use under a dual property right problem
With trespass enforcement level λ1, although the resource is still being
underused at input quantity xm
1 , the problem is not so severe as it was with
λ0. More rents are therefore being generated on the resource. Now though
this may look like an eﬃciency improvement on the previous situation, a
closer analysis reveals otherwise.
Note ﬁrst that the manager chooses xm
1 over xm
0 because he is now con-
strained to do so by the binding trespass constraint. The introduction of an
additional constraint suggests that the manager cannot be doing better at
exploitation level xm
1 and this is in fact the case. Notice that with a non-
binding trespass constraint, we have ∂πm/∂xm < 0 for all xm > 0. In order
to deter trespassers, the manager is therefore hiring additional inputs whose
theft adjusted marginal product is strictly lower than their cost. (Recall that
he does so because trespassers would in any case bring the exploitation level
to xm




We therefore have that the resource produces more rents with the lower
trespass enforcement level while the manager receives less rents. The thieves
are therefore picking up the diﬀerence. This does not, however, imply that
they are made better oﬀ in the process. Indeed, the additional resource out-
put induces thieves to increase their theft eﬀort by so much that the larger
booty is entirely dissipated by the costs of those eﬀorts. The upshot is that
in order to determine whether there is an overall eﬃciency gain, it must be
the case that the resource manager’s loss be smaller than the cost savings
originating from the lower trespass enforcement level λ1.
We therefore have that whenever trespass is binding, weaker trespass
enforcement leads to the adoption of higher input quantities by the manager.
In ﬁgure 4, it can be readily seen that further decreases in the value of λ lead
to new equilibria to the right of point D1 along curve (1 − s(Z(X)))p ¯ f(X).
With a low enough value of λ, we may thus encounter an equilibrium in which
the resource is being overused. This possibility is illustrated by point E in
ﬁgure 4, where the equilibrium input level xm
2 exceeds X∗. The following
proposition summarizes the foregoing observations:
Proposition 6 In the presence of theft, trespass tends to mitigate the prob-
lem of resource underuse and may even lead to overuse. The manager’s
rents strictly decrease while thieves are no better oﬀ. Whether there is an
eﬃciency gain will depend on the magnitude of the cost savings from lower
trespass enforcement.
This proposition introduces an indeterminacy in the theoretical prediction
regarding natural resource use in settings characterized by generally weak
property right enforcement. Indeed, in such cases, trespassing and theft are
likely to be both signiﬁcant problems for the resource manager. Whether this
leads the resource to be over- or under-exploited in equilibrium will depend
on the parameters of the problem, and those are ultimately determined by
the speciﬁc case at hand.
A corollary to proposition 6 is that the presence of theft may mitigate the
problem of resource overuse. To see why, suppose a situation of open access
` a la Gordon (1954) with parameter values θ = 1 and λ = 0 as discussed in
section 2. The equilibrium is then at point G in ﬁgure 4, where p ¯ f(XG) = c.
Introducing theft shifts the equilibrium exploitation level back, say to point
H. Hence the following corollary:24
Corollary 7 The presence of theft tends to mitigate the problem of resource
overuse.
In the light of those results, the next section is devoted to a reinterpre-
tation of the cases discussed in section 2. We do so by proposing some en-
forcement levels λ and θ which we consider to be reasonable approximations
of each speciﬁc case.
6 A fresh look at the evidence
6.1 The Gold Rush and the whalers
We argued in section 2 that both the Gold Rush and the whaling industry
could be represented by an open access to inputs (λ = 0) and an imperfect
output appropriation (0 < θ < 1). Representing the Gold Rush equilibrium
exploitation level by XGR, it is then characterized by the following conditions:
(1 − s(Z))p ¯ f(X
GR) = c, (35)
¯ s(Z)(1 − θ)pf(X
GR) = w. (36)
A comparison with open access and immediate marketing condition p ¯ f(XG) =
c, this yields XGR < XG. We therefore conclude that if claims to land con-
taining gold had been easy to secure, exploration eﬀorts may have been even
higher.
Under the same mechanism, one may conjecture that in the case of the
whaling industry, the adoption of a norm of capture had the eﬀective im-
pact of increasing θ. In accordance with corollary 7, whalers may then have
found it beneﬁcial to increase the whaling eﬀorts, an eﬀect which, paradoxi-
cally, may have contributed to the disappearance of the industry through a
depletion of the resource.
6.2 Cattle theft in the open range
In ﬁgure 1, the case of the open range in the American West was represented
by intermediate values of both θ and λ. According to our analysis, whether
the grassland was actually over- or under-stocked is consequently impossi-
ble to say without additional information. Yet, as mentioned in section 2,
researchers on the subject appear to have adopted the view that there was
over-stocking. We suspect that this position may be due to the habit of25
equating weak property rights with overuse. What is undisputable is that
ranchers did face a serious dual enforcement problem due to a weak state
presence. Based on this alone, one cannot be sure whether the land was
being over-or under-stocked, as the equilibrium can be represented by either
of points E or D1 in ﬁgure 4.
The problem of theft faced by common pasture cattlemen in Africa and
farmers in Zimbabwe, on the other hand, reports clearly an underuse of the
pasture. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 5 by the curve (1−s(Z(X)))p ¯ f(X) which
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Figure 5: Severe resource underuse under open access and theft
6.3 Farm theft
As discussed in section 2, urban agriculture is often severely aﬀected by the
problem of theft. Indeed, not only is protection diﬃcult to achieve on urban
plots, but the opportunity cost of thieves can be quite low due to their natural
proximity. It is well established in the crime literature that property theft is a
crime of opportunity as evidenced by the fact that proximity between victims
and criminals is an important determinant. In our model, this implies both
a low theft enforcement parameter θ and opportunity cost of theft eﬀorts
w. From (6), one can readily verify that a low θ value combined with a low
w implies that the ex-enforcement theft payoﬀ ¯ s(Z)pf(X) must remain low.
This corresponds to either little output being produced or a large amount of26
theft eﬀort is necessary to drive down ¯ s(Z). But with a large theft eﬀort,
s(Z) becomes arbitrarily close to 1 which, once inserted into condition (16),
leads to an equilibrium marginal product of the resource much in excess of
its marginal cost c. Either way, we end up with severe resource underuse.
In the cases of urban home farming and rural theft, if we assume that
θUHF > θRT and given that λ ≈ 1, we would have XULF < XRT < XUHF <
X∗.
6.4 Inshore ﬁshery
This case is illustrated in ﬁgure 1 by θ = 1 and 0 < λ < 1. We thus have






Parameter λ is therefore not high enough to completely deter trespassing at
eﬃcient input level X∗. The manager will consequently increase the input
use at XIF > X∗ in order to bring down the average product to the point






In the presence of partial input exclusion enforcement, we therefore have
X∗ < XIF < XG. Such inshore ﬁsheries are overexploited but not so much
as to completely dissipate the rents.
7 Conclusion
Our analysis started out with the observation that in the Gordon (1954)
model, although resource users could not be excluded from exploiting a re-
source, they enjoyed full property rights over the fruits of their eﬀorts. Since
this results in resource overuse, weak property have tended to be equated
with resource overuse. This representation of weak property rights over nat-
ural resources has essentially become the norm over the years.
In this paper, we presented evidence to the eﬀect that weak property
rights can also often take the form of output appropriation problems, or theft.
This will typically be the case under a weak state presence. A situation
in which problems of both input exclusion and output appropriation are27
simultaneously present was referred to as a dual enforcement problem. A
theoretical model was then proposed to gain insight into the nature of the
the dual problem. As a principal result, we showed that each property right
problem tends to pull input use in opposite directions: A lower enforcement
of input exclusion tends to increase input use while a lower enforcement of
output appropriation tends to lower input use. This has led us to conclude
that when property rights are generally weak, one cannot say whether a
natural resource will be over- or under-exploited in equilibrium.
There are many directions in which this work could be extended. Obvious
ones include the introduction of explicit resource dynamics or endogenous
enforcement of property rights. Another one would be a normative analysis
of the timing of public enforcement measures, that is, given that it is costly
to increase θ and λ, which of the two should the state concentrate on ﬁrst?
Relatedly, both Ellickson (1991) and Umbeck (1981) report on eﬀorts by local
communities to solve the problem of output appropriation while seemingly
ignoring input access issues. The present model may be used as a basis for
a positive analysis of this behavior. Finally, we hope that the analysis will
inspire empirical work with regards to natural resource use in developing
economies.
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